Export Controls and Embargoes: How Does Ankara Explain Its Argument Over Allied Arms Restrictions and Double Standards?

Why It Matters

Since 1975, several NATO allies have restricted arms transfers to Türkiye, citing national law, human-rights and regional-stability criteria, or technology-security concerns. Each episode has strengthened Ankara's case for domestic production, and each has fed a continuing argument over whether allied rules are applied evenly. This desk article sets out the verifiable episodes, the legal basis of export licensing, the reasons governments give, and Türkiye's double-standards argument. It deliberately leaves out trade-value figures that cannot be traced to official databases.

Background

The legal basis of export licensing

Arms exports are licensed nationally, under a layered set of national, regional and international rules. The main instruments are:

• National law. Every exporting state licenses transfers under its own statutes. In the United States these include the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which also govern re-transfer and the use of US-origin components. Governments in Europe and Canada apply national export-control laws and parliamentary or ministerial review.
• EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (8 December 2008). It is legally binding on EU member states and sets eight criteria. They include respect for international obligations, the human-rights and humanitarian-law record of the recipient, the internal situation and regional peace, the national security of member states and allies, and the risk of diversion. The decision to grant or refuse a licence stays with each member state.
• The Arms Trade Treaty (adopted 2013, in force since 24 December 2014). It bars transfers that would violate UN Security Council arms embargoes or facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. It also requires states parties to assess the risk of serious violations of international humanitarian or human-rights law. Readers should check each state's status in the UN Treaty Collection.
• CAATSA (2017). The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act is a sanctions statute rather than a licensing regime. Section 231 targets significant transactions with Russia's defence and intelligence sectors.
• Multilateral regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement coordinates dual-use and conventional-arms controls but does not produce binding embargoes.

A NATO ally is not exempt from any of these. Membership of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty creates no entitlement to arms purchases from another member.

Dated table of restriction episodes

Two patterns stand out. The embargoes of 1975 and 2019–2020 each followed a Turkish security decision the supplier opposed (Cyprus, S-400, Syria). The later easing steps were tied to alliance bargaining rather than to a change in the legal criteria.

Domestic industry as a response

Türkiye's modern defence-industrial base grew largely after the 1975 embargo. ASELSAN was founded in 1975 by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, HAVELSAN followed in 1982 and ROKETSAN in 1988. The Defence Industry Undersecretariat created in 1985 became the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in 2018. The desk's explainer on what 'around 80 percent domestic' means and how it is measured shows why headline localisation figures need method notes, and why subsystems such as engines and sensors matter more than the headline number. For a broader view of how exports interact with alliance politics, see The Worldlogue's analysis of defense exports and technology transfer.

Key Players & Positions

United States

The US administration and Congress have argued that operating the Russian S-400 alongside the F-35 would expose the stealth aircraft's systems to potential Russian intelligence collection and that the S-400 cannot be integrated into NATO air-defence architecture. CAATSA Section 231 requires sanctions on significant Russian defence transactions, and the State Department announced the SSB measures on 14 December 2020. In the 1970s, supporters of the embargo in Congress presented it as a legal consequence of the use of US-origin arms in Cyprus and as leverage for a settlement.

European governments and the EU

Governments that restricted exports in 2019 cited the humanitarian situation in northern Syria and the Common Position criteria on regional peace and human rights. The 14 October 2019 EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions committed member states to strong national positions on arms exports to Türkiye and did not impose an EU-wide embargo. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have urged partners to take Eastern Mediterranean tensions into account in licensing. Some governments, notably Sweden and Finland, later stated that no embargo exists, following the 28 June 2022 memorandum.

NATO

NATO officials have generally described the S-400 purchase as a national decision while noting allied concerns about interoperability and technology security. NATO has no collective arms-export mechanism, so allied restrictions remain bilateral. For the Alliance-level picture, see Interstate Journal on Türkiye in NATO.

Rights organisations and other critics

Human-rights groups argue that licensing criteria under the Common Position and the Arms Trade Treaty require exporters to weigh the risk that arms may be used in serious violations of humanitarian law, and that political alliance does not remove that duty. Their reasoning is generally framed around specific end uses and operations rather than around Türkiye's alliance status.

Source Comparison

Readers should consult the primary documents directly: the statutes, the EU Council conclusions, the State Department notice of December 2020 and the MFA and SSB statements. The desk's Editorial Principles explain how it separates documented fact from stated position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• CAATSA Section 231: US law requiring sanctions on persons engaged in significant transactions with Russia's defence or intelligence sectors. Its use against an allied state's procurement agency was unprecedented.
• SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): Türkiye's procurement and defence-industry authority, successor to the Defence Industry Undersecretariat (1985).
• EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP: the EU's binding export-control criteria, applied nationally by member states.
• Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): the 2013 treaty regulating international trade in conventional arms and requiring risk assessments.
• End-use certificate: a document in which the buyer states the intended end user and agrees not to re-export without permission.
• ITAR: US regulations controlling US-origin defence articles, including re-transfers.

Related reading on this site: the 80-percent domestic production explainer, Security Desk on Article 51, Editorial Principles, and About International Affairs Desk. From our sister publications: The Worldlogue on defence exports and Interstate Journal on Türkiye in NATO.

International Affairs Desk Editorial Team. This article reflects International Affairs Desk's editorial perspective, which presents Türkiye's official positions and legal arguments alongside the context needed to evaluate them. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly.