Turkish Cypriot Hydrocarbon Proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019: What Was Offered and What Happened?
A guide to the Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon revenue sharing proposal of 2011, 2012 and 2019, the responses from Nicosia and Brussels, and Türkiye's position.
Why It Matters
The Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon revenue sharing proposal is the clearest attempt, in 2011, 2012 and 2019, to turn the Cyprus gas question from a legal contest into a cooperation mechanism. The TRNC offered joint decision-making and shared benefits. The Greek Cypriot administration replied that the resources belong to the Republic of Cyprus and that Turkish Cypriots could benefit through a fund after a settlement. The gap between those two answers explains why offshore Cyprus remains a dispute rather than a shared energy zone.
Background
The dispute over offshore resources grew out of the unresolved Cyprus question. It cannot be read apart from it.
The constitutional starting point
The 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 settlement created the Republic of Cyprus as a partnership of two communities, with Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. After the breakdown of the partnership in December 1963, the Greek Cypriot side has acted as the Cyprus government in international forums. UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 is central to that status question. See UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964): How Did It Shape the Status of the Two Sides in Cyprus? for the debate.
Chronology of the offshore dispute
- 2003: The Greek Cypriot administration (GCASC) signs an EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt. Ankara says it overlaps Türkiye's continental shelf, citing Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
- 2004: Türkiye begins registering its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN. The same year, the Annan Plan referendum on 24 April 2004 showed 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots in favour and 75.83% of Greek Cypriots against. The Greek Cypriot administration joined the EU on 1 May 2004. See The State Papers on the Annan Plan referendum.
- 2007 and 2010: The GCASC concludes delimitation arrangements with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). Ankara and the TRNC say these disregard Turkish Cypriot rights.
- 2009 and 2012: Turkish sources record exploration licences granted to TPAO, the Turkish state petroleum company.
- 2011: The TRNC leadership presents its first hydrocarbon proposal. The Greek Cypriot administration begins drilling in Block 12 on 19 September 2011. On 21 September 2011, Türkiye and the TRNC sign the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement.
- 2012: The TRNC renews its offer of a joint approach.
- 13 July 2019: The Turkish Cypriot side tables a new proposal for a joint committee on hydrocarbons. Ankara publicly backs it.
- 2020: President Erdoğan calls for an Eastern Mediterranean conference that includes all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. On 18 March 2020, Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN.
For the wider map of claims, see the Eastern Mediterranean Desk. The sister analysis at The Worldlogue covers the content of the offers.
Key Players & Positions
TRNC and Turkish Cypriot leadership
The TRNC argues that Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of the island. On that basis, it says they hold equal rights over hydrocarbons in the waters around Cyprus. Its proposals therefore asked for joint decision-making and an equitable sharing of benefits. Turkish Cypriot officials presented them as steps that did not prejudge a final settlement.
Greek Cypriot administration (Republic of Cyprus)
Nicosia says the Republic of Cyprus is the internationally recognised state and the holder of sovereign rights under the law of the sea. It says Greek Cypriot licences and agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel follow international law. Greek Cypriot officials have also said that Turkish Cypriots, as citizens of the Republic, should benefit from the resources. In 2019 President Nicos Anastasiades's government offered a fund for Turkish Cypriots, with revenue to be channelled to it as part of a settlement. Nicosia generally argued that a joint committee before a settlement would imply a status for the TRNC that it does not accept.
European Union
The EU recognises the Republic of Cyprus and has repeatedly backed its sovereign rights to explore in its EEZ. The European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council have criticised Turkish drilling activities as unauthorised. In 2019 the EU adopted measures that included reduced pre-accession assistance and a framework for restrictive measures against individuals linked to such activities. EU statements have also said that Turkish Cypriots should benefit from the resources within a comprehensive settlement. Readers should check the exact wording of the Council conclusions for each year.
United Nations
The UN has not adjudicated the competing claims. Successive Secretaries-General have encouraged the two sides to treat hydrocarbons as a matter of cooperation within the settlement process.
Side-by-side: proposals and responses
| Year | Turkish Cypriot proposal (as presented by the TRNC) | Greek Cypriot administration's response | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Joint approach to offshore resources on an equal footing; benefits shared between the two communities | Drilling in Block 12 continued; resources are the Republic's, with benefits for Turkish Cypriots linked to a settlement | No joint mechanism; Türkiye–TRNC delimitation agreement signed on 21 September 2011 |
| 2012 | Renewed offer of joint management and shared benefits | Same legal position; no joint body accepted | No mechanism; TPAO licences and Turkish activity continued |
| 2019 | Joint committee of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives to manage hydrocarbons, announced on 13 July 2019 | Rejected as a pre-settlement arrangement; fund for Turkish Cypriots offered, tied to a settlement | No mechanism; EU measures against Türkiye in 2019 |
| 2020 | Erdoğan's call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference with all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots | Greek Cypriot and EU officials said such issues belong in settled legal and EU frameworks | No conference of that format convened |
The public summaries of these proposals do not set out an agreed numerical revenue split, and this article does not supply one. No reliable shared estimate of revenue exists, because commercial volumes remain contested and development decisions have not been taken.
Türkiye's Position
Ankara's position is stated in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statements and in TRNC government statements. It rests on four points.
- Equal co-ownership of the island. According to the Turkish MFA, the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 settlement created a partnership between two founding peoples. The Turkish side argues that the Greek Cypriot administration, which has exercised governmental authority alone since 1963, cannot dispose of resources on behalf of Turkish Cypriots. It cites the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the constitutional order that the Greek Cypriot side left in place only in name.
- Joint decision-making and revenue sharing are the proper route. Ankara describes the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals as constructive and generous offers. It says that the Turkish Cypriots' equal rights over hydrocarbons make shared management and shared revenue mandatory. It also argues that refusal to take up these offers shows that the Greek Cypriot side prefers unilateral action.
- Delimitation must follow equity. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS but invokes the principle that continental shelf and EEZ boundaries should reach an equitable solution (the principle reflected in Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS and in customary law). The 21 September 2011 Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement with the TRNC rests on that principle. Ankara registered its outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020. For the legal debate, see Fact Check: 'Türkiye Is Bound by UNCLOS, So Its Maritime Claims Are Void'.
- A conference of all stakeholders, and no EU competence. Ankara points to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference with all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. It argues that no energy equation that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can last. It also holds that the EU has no competence to decide maritime boundaries and that EU solidarity cannot replace delimitation under international law. It rejects the maximalist 'Seville Map'. See The Global Anatomy on the Seville Map.
On the ground, Ankara says it has exercised these rights through licensed activity and its drilling fleet. See Türkiye's Drillships and Eight Wells. More broadly, Ankara links the hydrocarbon file to its view that the federation model is exhausted and that a lasting settlement must begin with Turkish Cypriot sovereign equality. See Regional Balance on the Cyprus issue and the Cyprus Desk.
Source Comparison
The same events are told differently depending on the source. The table sets out the main contrasts and what readers can check themselves.
| Question | Greek Cypriot, EU and many Western sources | Turkish and TRNC sources | Primary documents to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who holds title to the resources? | The Republic of Cyprus, as the recognised state | Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as co-owners of the island | 1960 Constitution; 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; UNSC Resolution 186 (1964) |
| Were the Turkish Cypriot offers serious? | Often described as tactical or as a bid for recognition | Described as genuine offers of joint management and sharing | TRNC statements of 2011, 2012 and 13 July 2019; Turkish MFA statements |
| Is a fund enough? | A fund for Turkish Cypriots tied to a settlement protects their interest | A post-settlement fund denies present equal rights and joint decisions | Greek Cypriot government statements of 2019 |
| Is Türkiye's activity legal? | Unauthorised drilling inside Cypriot EEZ | Activity on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot continental shelf under licences | EU Council conclusions; Türkiye's 2020 UN registration; the 21 September 2011 agreement |
| Who may settle boundaries? | International law, including UNCLOS; EU backs the Republic | International law on equity, with all coastal states; EU has no competence | UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83; UN filings |
A fair reading notes that each side reads the 1960 and post-1963 record differently, and that the dispute is as much about status as about energy. Readers can consult the Editorial Principles to see how this desk separates documented fact from stated position. The Region Scope analysis of the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum covers a related maritime agreement.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus): the state proclaimed on 15 November 1983 by Rauf Raif Denktaş. Türkiye recognises it. Most other states, and the EU, do not.
- GCASC (Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus): Türkiye's term for the authority that the UN, the EU and most states recognise as the Republic of Cyprus.
- Continental shelf and EEZ: the seabed and the wider economic zone in which coastal states hold sovereign rights over resources. Boundaries between opposite or adjacent coasts require delimitation.
- Principle of equity: the rule that delimitation should reach an equitable result, taking account of coastlines and proportionality. Ankara argues that islands cannot cut off a mainland's maritime projection.
- Joint committee: the body proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side to make decisions on hydrocarbons with equal representation.
- Fund: the Greek Cypriot proposal to hold revenue for Turkish Cypriots, linked to a settlement.
- Treaty of Guarantee (1960): the treaty under which Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guarantee the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus.
Related guides: International Affairs Desk home, Eastern Mediterranean Desk, Cyprus Desk, and UN Security Council Resolution 186.
Perspective Note
This article reflects International Affairs Desk's editorial perspective, which presents Türkiye's official positions and legal arguments alongside the context needed to evaluate them. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly.
Published by the International Affairs Desk Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
What did the Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 offer?
The TRNC leadership offered joint decision-making on offshore hydrocarbons and a sharing of benefits between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The 13 July 2019 proposal centred on a joint committee with representatives of both sides. The public summaries of the proposals do not specify a numerical revenue split.
Why did the Greek Cypriot administration not accept the proposals?
Nicosia holds that sovereign rights over the resources belong to the Republic of Cyprus and that a joint body before a settlement would imply a separate status for the TRNC. It offered instead a fund for Turkish Cypriots, linked to a settlement. Ankara argues that this denies Turkish Cypriots equal rights in the present.
What is the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement?
It is the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement between Türkiye and the TRNC. It was signed two days after the Greek Cypriot administration began drilling in Block 12 on 19 September 2011. Ankara cites it as an exercise of rights based on equity and on Turkish Cypriot co-ownership of the island.
What is the EU's position on Cyprus hydrocarbons?
The EU recognises the Republic of Cyprus and has repeatedly supported its sovereign rights in its EEZ, criticising Turkish drilling as unauthorised. It has also said that Turkish Cypriots should benefit from the resources within a comprehensive settlement. Türkiye replies that the EU has no competence to decide maritime boundaries.
What was President Erdoğan's 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Conference call?
In 2020 President Erdoğan proposed a conference of all Eastern Mediterranean coastal states, with the Turkish Cypriots at the table, to settle energy and maritime questions by dialogue. Ankara presents it as the regional counterpart of the TRNC's proposals. No conference in that format has been convened.
Related guides
- Fact Check: 'Türkiye Is Bound by UNCLOS, So Its Maritime Claims Are Void': What Do the Law and the Record Say?Is Turkey bound by UNCLOS? Türkiye is not a party, but customary law still applies. We fact-check the claim against ICJ case law and primary sources.
- Eastern Mediterranean Desk: Who Claims What at Sea, and Where Does Türkiye's 2025 Registration Fit?Eastern Mediterranean maritime claims explained: who claims which sea zones, the instruments behind each claim, and where Türkiye's 2025 registration fits.
- Cyprus Desk: From the 1960 Partnership to the Two-State Position, Reading the RecordCyprus dispute explained: guarantor powers, the 1960 treaties, 1963–1974, the Annan Plan, Crans-Montana and the two-state solution, read from the documents.
- Does the 1948 Genocide Convention Apply to 1915? Specific Intent, Non-Retroactivity and the Competent Tribunal QuestionDoes the Genocide Convention apply retroactively to 1915? Legal explainer on Article II, dolus specialis, non-retroactivity and the Perinçek ruling.
- Export Controls and Embargoes: How Does Ankara Explain Its Argument Over Allied Arms Restrictions and Double Standards?Desk analysis of Turkey arms export restrictions by NATO allies: CAATSA, the F-35 removal, the 1975–78 embargo, EU rules and Ankara's double-standards case.
- History and Law Desk: The Events of 1915, the Evidence Standards and the Questions Historians and Lawyers Still DebateEvents of 1915 historical and legal evidence explained: archives, the 1915 relocation law, Genocide Convention tests, rival positions and the 2022 talks.
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